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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the Canadian law. However, the complete scope of these provisions
have not been determined.
HENRY W. CONNELLY
Constitutional Law-Injunction to Prohibit Use in State Courts of
Evidence Illegally Obtained by Federal Agents
A federal narcotics agent seized petitioner's marihuana under a search
warrant improperly issued under Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The United States District Court granted a pre-
trial motion to suppress this evidence under Rule 41 (e), and on the Gov-
ernment's later motion dismissed the federal indictment. The federal
agent then swore to a complaint before a New Mexico State judge and
caused a warrant for the petitioner's arrest to issue. Petitioner was
charged with being in possession of marihuana in violation of New
Mexico law. In the United States District Court, petitioner sought to
enjoin the federal agent from testifying in the state prosecution and to
direct the agent to reacquire the evidence and destroy it or transfer it to
other agents. The injunction was denied and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.1 Certiorari being granted, the United States Supreme Court,
by five to four decision, reversed and directed that the injunction be
granted by the United States District Court. Rea v. United States.2
The federal rule excluding evidence illegally obtained by federal
officers was originally declared in the case of Weeks v. United States.3
Under the Weeks decision, evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment to the U. S. Constitution
is not admissible in federal courts -when obtained by the federal govern-
ment or its agents. Since the fourth amendment protects the right of
privacy only from invasion by the federal government, this exclusionary
rule does not bar the use in federal courts of evidence illegally obtained
by private citizens or state officers who were not acting in collaboration
with federal officers. Although many states have adopted the ex-
clusionary rule as applied to evidence illegally obtained by state agents
for use in state courts,4 the federal constitution does not compel them
to do so.5
The states adopting the exclusionary rule as a means of suppressing
' 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
" 350 U. S. 214 (1956) ; noted in 24 TENN. L. IEv. 605 (1956).
232 U. S. 383 (1914).
'A list of states adopting the exclusionary rule may be found in Annot. 50
A. L. R. 2d 531 at 536 (1956).
'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1944). The due process clause of the 14thAmendment is not violated by the states' use of illegally obtained evidence provided
the method of acquisition is not so harsh as to violate the basic concepts of such
clause. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
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illegal search and seizure by state officers follow the federal government
in admitting evidence illegally acquired by private citizens.0 The ad-
missibility in state proceedings of evidence illegally obtained by federal
officers not cooperating with state agents is a subject on which there are
divergent views. Among the states having the exclusionary rule, the
majority of those which have acted on the question have held such
evidence inadmissible.7  The rationale of this majority is that the state
judiciary is obligated by the Constitution to effectively give force to the
fourth amendment's protection against the invasion of the right of
privacy by the federal government; and as the most effective means of
discharging this duty, the majority excludes such evidence. This is not
to say that these states construe the fourth amendment as requiring the
adoption of such an. exclusionary rule.
How does the Rea decision affect the question of admissibility in
state courts of evidence illegally acquired by federal officers? In per-
mitting the injunction against the use of such evidence, the majority
opinion stated that no constitutional issue is involved and declared that
the Court's power to enjoin the federal officer from testifying stems from
its power to police and enforce the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As to the Court's power to control the possession of the contraband,
the Court cited a federal statute which provides that: "All property taken
or obtained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be
repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and
subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States
having jurisdiction thereof."8  The majority opinion further stated that
Wolf v. Colorado9 is in no way affected, and carefully pointed out that
no injunction was sought against a state official. Reliance on the Court's
supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies seems to be
the sole ground for the decision, and McNabb v. United States0 was
cited as authority for this view. The McNabb case declared inadmissible
in a federal prosecution a confession obtained during a period of illegal
detention in violation of a federal statute. The Court stated that in de-
'Chapman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 439, 264 S. W. 181 (1924); Gilliam v.
Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 342, 92 S. W. 2d 346 (1936) ; Hampton v. State, 132 Miss.
154, 96 So. 165 (1923) ; State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S. W. 2d 794 (1942);
State v. Barrett, 121 Or. 57, 254 P. 198 (1927).
" State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927) ; Walters v. Commonwealth,
199 Ky. 182, 250 S. W. 839 (1923) ; Ingram v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 284, 254
S. W. 894 (1923); Little v. State, 171 Miss. 819, 159 So. 103 (1935) ; State v.
Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858 (1924) ; State v. Horton, 312 Mo. 202, 278
S. W. 661 (1925); State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 P. 2 (1930). Conlra,
State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 P. 574 (1926) ; State ex rel. Kuhr v. District
Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268 P. 501 (1928); Johnson v. State, 155 Tenn. 628, 299 S. W.
800 (1927).
'62 STAT. 974 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 2463 (1953).
9 See Note 5 supra.
1- 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
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termining exclusionary rules of evidence the federal courts are not re-
stricted to those powers derived solely from the Constitution.
The Rea dissenting opinion rejected the McNabb case as the basis
for such extensive judicial power of supervision over federal law enforce-
ment agencies and would have confined the Court's supervisory power
over the admission of evidence to federal cases. In substance, the dissent
takes the view that under the majority opinion the judiciary has invaded
the executive responsibility for supervising law enforcement activities.
In support of this position, the following was quoted from the McNabb
decision: ". . we confine ourselves to our limited function as the Court
of ultimate review of the standards formulated and applied by the federal
courts in the trial of criminal cases. W¥e are not concerned with the law
enforcement practices except in so far as the courts themselves become
instruments of the law."'
1
Because of the strong dissenting opinion, it seems likely that the Rea
decision may later be construed so narrowly as to reconcile the majority
and minority opinions. It is submitted that since the federal court was
an instrument of the law in issuing the invalid search warrant, such a
reconciliation might be effected by narrowly construing the majority's
position to mean that the federal court can control that which was ob-
tained through federal judicial action. The dissent apparently antici-
pated this possible construction for it questions whether the Court's
decision would have been different had the evidence been obtained with-
out a search warrant.
The dissenting opinion further urged that the present decision violates
federal policy as established by Stefanelli v. Minard.1' In that case the
Court refused to enjoin the use of evidence illegally seized by the state
in a state prosecution on the grounds that the federal intervention in state
criminal proceedings would be violative of the ". . . special delicacy of the
adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable powers and the
State administration of its own laws.' 3 The minority in the Rea de-
cision argued that while in the instant case the injunction was against
the federal agent's testifying, it was in effect enjoining state criminal pro-
ceedings since the state's case appeared to depend wholly on the evidence
in question. This criticism, like that against the Court's reliance on the
McNabb case, can be reconciled with the majority decision by arguing
that the federal judiciary's connection with the illegality was sufficient to
justify the federal interference in this area of delicate adjustment.
The dissent also pointed out that since under the Wolf decision a
conviction in state courts under evidence illegally obtained would not
be reversed because of the illegality per se, the federal interference in the
" Id. at 347. "342 U. S. 117 (1951).18 Id. at 120.
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present case would seem to be justified only if the federal injunction pro-
ceeding can be completed prior to the use of the evidence in the state
prosecution.
In view of the fact that the injunction would seem to be of value only
if issued prior to the use of the evidence in the state prosecution, and
since the Rea decision could be narrowly construed to permit an in-
junction against the use in state courts of evidence illegally obtained
by federal agents only where the federal judiciary was connected with
the illegality, it would appear that the question of admissibility in state
prosecutions of evidence illegally obtained by federal officers is still
worthy of attention by state courts.
Assuming the issue remains one of importance, it might be well to
consider the possible bases for the exclusion of such evidence in North
Carolina. While no case has been found which indicates the position that
our Court would take on this question, it would seem that there are
three grounds upon which such evidence could be declared inadmissible.
The first argument which could be made in favor of excluding such
evidence is that such a result is required by G. S. § 15-27 which reads
as follows: "Any officer who shall sign or issue or cause to be signed
and issued a search warrant without first requiring the complainant or
other person to sign an affidavit under oath and examining said person
or complainant in regard thereto shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and
no facts discovered by reason of the issuance of such illegal search war-
rant shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action: Provided,
no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant
in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance
of a search warrant, shall be competent in the trial of any action.' 4
The conclusion that this statute renders inadmissible in North Caro-
lina courts evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers would require
that the word officer be construed to include both state and federal
agents, and would further require an interpretation to the effect that
the statute applies to all situations involving illegal acquisition of evi-
dence.
This liberal construction appears to be unlikely. Prior to the statute,
the common law rule admitting illegal evidence prevailed in North
Carolina,' 5 and since its adoption, the statute has received a strict con-
struction. As originally enacted in 1937, the statute did not contain the
proviso in the last sentence, and before the addition of the proviso by
" N. C. GEx. STAT. § 15-27 (1953), noted in 15 N. C. L. Rav. 343 (1937), 29
N. C. L. REv. 396 (1951).
" State v. Wallace, 162 N. C. 622, 78 S. E. 1 (1913).
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amendment in 1951, it was interpreted as not rendering incompetent
evidence illegally obtained through a search without a warrant., 6
This history of strict construction would favor a finding that the
word officer as used in the statute included only state agents. Further-
more, since the statute declares incompetent only evidence obtained under
an invalid warrant or obtained without a warrant where the acquisition
was made under conditions requiring the same, a narrow construction
might render admissible evidence illegally obtained where a legal method
of acquisition not requiring a search warrant existed. For example, the
use of a stomach pump, employed by force, as a means of carrying out a
search incident to an arrest might render the method of acquiring evi-
dence illegal. Such evidence might be admissible under the statute, how-
ever, because the search, being incident to the arrest, would not be one
made under conditions requiring the issuance of a search warrant.
In addition, in North Carolina search warrants apparently may be
issued only as authorized by statute, and it might be held that condi-
tions requiring issuance of a warrant are confined to those circum-
stances in which a warrant is authorized ofi the theory that unless a
warrant is authorized it can never be required17 As an example of
the application of this possible construction, consider a search and
seizure, made without a warrant and not incidental to arrest, under
which liquor was obtained which was illegally possessed solely for the
purpose of consumption. Since search warrants apparently may be
issued only where authorized by statute, the absence of such a statute
covering this situation prevents the existence of conditions requiring the
issuance of a search warrant. It might be held, therefore, that the
search was not made under conditions requiring the issuance of a war-
rant, and the evidence so obtained is not excluded by the terms of the
statute. This last construction would confine the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence to those situations where a legal method acquisition
exists by a search warrant. Because of these possible narrow con-
structions of G. S. § 15-27, it would seem that even if the statute applied
to federal officers, only a limited character of illegally obtained evidence
might be held inadmissible.
1" State v. Shermer, 216 N. C. 719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1940) ; State v. McGee, 214
N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
'7 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25'(1953) authorizes issuance of warrants for: (1)
stolen property; (2) false or counterfeit coins, notes, bills, or bonds, and instru-
ments used for counterfeiting them; (3) any personal property, tickets, books,
papers, and documents used in connection with and in the operation of lotteries,
gaming, and gambling. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-3 (1953) provides for search war-
rants for liquor illegally possessed for the purpose of sale. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-351 (1953) authorizes search warrants for deserting seamen. N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 13-91 (d) (1953) provides for search warrants for game taken in violation
of the game law. N. C. GEa. STAT. § 80-28 (1950) authorizes search warrants
for re-used beverage bottles.
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As a second ground for the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained
by federal officers, it could be argued that the Court should adopt a
judicial policy barring all evidence illegally obtained by state or federal
officers as a means of suppressing illegal search and seizure within the
state. Such a policy might be deemed warranted on the basis of modern
developments in this area and on the basis of G. S. § 15-27 as indicative
of legislative intent in this direction. This would go further than the
federal rule which excludes only evidence illegally obtained by federal
agents.
As a third basis for declaring inadmissible in North Carolina evi-
dence unlawfully obtained by federal officers, it could be urged that a
rule excluding the same should be adopted as the most effective means
by which the Court can discharge its obligation to uphold the fourth
amendment. As has been mentioned previously, this argument has been
adopted by some of the courts which have acted on the question.
Without regard to the alternative merits of the bases suggested
above for declaring inadmissible in the state courts evidence unlawfully
acquired by federal officer's, it is to be hoped that North Carolina will
exclude such evidence should the question arise. The suppression of
illegal search and seizure by federal agents can be rendered truly
effective only by making it known in advance that any evidence taken
in an illegal manner will be inadmissible in proving the guilt of the ac-
cused in either state or federal criminal proceedings.
JAMES C. Fox.
Constitutional Law-Requisites of Notice of Governmental Action
The United States- Supreme Court cast new light on the requisites of
notice under the due process clause of the Constitution in the recent
decision of Walker v. City of Hutchinson.' The defendant city, in the
exercise of its statutory power of eminent domain,2 condemned property
of the plaintiff for purposes of street widening. In accordance with the
provision of the statute, the property owners were notified by publication
that the hearing was to be held to determine compensation.3 The Court
found that the notice provided by the act was not reasonably calculated
to inform a known resident landowner of condemnation proceedings
against his property, and, therefore, that Fourteenth Amendment require-
quirements of due process of law were not met. "Even a letter," it was
'352 U. S. 112 (1956).
-K.A. GEN. STAT. § 26-202 (1949).
'In accordance with the statute, there was one published notice given in the
official city newspaper ten days before the hearing. The Court, however, laid no
stress on this point, but based its decision upon the inadequacy of notice by publica-
tion generally when some better means of giving notice is readily available.
[Vol. 35
